Talent-Consolidating Mergers: Labor Market Power and Innovation

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Working Paper Number: CES-26-67

Abstract

This paper argues that mergers that substantially increase firms’ labor market power can weaken inventors’ incentives to innovate by limiting the rents they capture from their innovations. We test this mechanism using linked employer-employee data from the U.S. Census Bureau. At both target and acquiring firms, inventors who experience large increases in concentration in already concentrated labor markets capture a smaller share of the surplus from their innovations and produce fewer patents, particularly high-quality ones; they also have lower earnings and become less likely to change jobs after the merger. Inventors at non-merging firms likewise experience declines in patenting and earnings when mergers increase concentration in their labor markets. Our results are robust to comparing inventors within the same firm across technological fields and to controlling for field-specific shocks, and we find no comparable effects around failed mergers. Taken together, our findings show that labor market power shapes inventors’ incentives and productivity and constitutes an overlooked channel through which M&As affect innovation.

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